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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jessica Halbesleben appeals from her conviction and sentence on two 
felony counts of injury to a child. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Officers found Halbesleben's seven children living in filthy and dangerous 
conditions, with insufficient food. (PSI, pp. 2-3, 28, 31-33.1) The children were 
suffering from several injuries, and some of their wounds were infected to the 
point that, left untreated, amputation of fingers and toes would have resulted. 
(PSI, p. 5.) Halbesleben had delegated most of her parenting duties to her 
thirteen-year-old daughter, to the point that the daughter claimed in police 
interviews that the filthy conditions were her fault. (PSI, pp. 5-6, 40.) 
Officers also learned that the older Halbesleben boys (ages 12 and nine) 
had been sexually abusing three of their younger siblings (ages four, two and 
one), and that Halbesleben had taken minimal efforts to prevent the abuse (she 
had padlocked the outside of the door to the boys' bedroom and barricaded the 
younger girls in their room, and would "hogtie" the boys when she went to the 
garage to smoke) and no efforts to address the harm from the abuse. (PSI, pp. 
3-4, 22, 34, 36-37.) She later admitted knowing that the sexual abuse had been 
ongoing for more than three years. (PSI, p. 3.) 
1 Attachments to PSI are referenced by page numbering sequential to pages in 
PSI. 
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A grand jury indicted Halbesleben and her husband on four counts of 
felony injury to a child. (R., pp. 6-8.) Halbesleben and the state entered a plea 
agreement whereby Halbesleben pied guilty to two counts of injury to a child and 
the state dismissed the two other counts and also a charge of failure to report 
sexual abuse, agreed not to file additional charges, and agreed to recommend 
consecutive sentences of ten years with one year determinate. (R., pp. 87-97; 
11/04/05 Tr., p. 1, L. 4 - p. 8, L. 25.) 
At the sentencing hearing, after an extensive argument setting forth the 
facts of the case, the prosecutor did argue for consecutive sentences of ten 
years with one year fixed (an aggregate of twenty years with two fixed), 
contending that anything less would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. 
(5/03/06 Tr., p. 17, L. 14 - p. 25, L. 6.) Counsel for Halbesleben argued that 
there were mitigating circumstances, articulated differences with the state's 
recitation of the facts, and argued for probation or a retained jurisdiction. 
(5/03/06 Tr., p. 25, L. 10 - p. 40, L. 18.) The district court imposed consecutive 
sentences of ten years with three determinate, for an aggregate of twenty years 
with six determinate, and ordered the sentences executed. (R., pp. 113-17; 
5/03/06 Tr., p. 41, L. 25 - p. 48, L. 22.) 
Halbesleben filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., 
pp. 118-34.) Halbesleben then appealed from the denial of her Rule 35 motion. 
(R., pp. 135-37.) 
Halbesleben also sought relief by filing a post-conviction petition. (#35029 
R., pp. 5-24.) The district court in that action found ineffective assistance of 
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counsel in failing to file an appeal timely from entry of the criminal judgment. 
(#35029 R., pp. 77-79.) The district court re-entered the criminal judgment to 
grant the right to appeal, and Halbesleben filed a notice of appeal from the re-
entered judgment. (Supp. R., pp. 11-16.) 
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ISSUES 
Halbesleben states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether Ms. Halbesleben is entitled to withdraw her guilty 
plea because the state breached the plea agreement by 
impliedly disavowing the recommendation it was required to 
make. 
II. Whether the district court erred by imposing an excessive 
sentence and/or by denying the /.C.R. rule [sic] 35 motion for 
sentence reduction. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Halbesleben failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in the 
prosecutor's argument in favor of the sentencing recommendation it agreed to 
make? 
2. Has Halbesleben failed to show an abuse of the sentencing court's 
discretion? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Halbesleben Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor's Argument Was 
Fundamentally At Odds With The State's Recommendation 
A. Introduction 
At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued for the sentence the state 
agreed to recommend by pointing out the facts of the case, particularly the 
degree of neglect. (5/03/06 Tr., p. 17, L. 14 - p. 25, L. 6.) The defense, in turn, 
disputed some of the facts, argued that Halbesleben's husband was the primary 
reason for the neglect (and had actively abused the children), argued that 
Halbesleben was a first-time offender, and contended that she should be put on 
probation or given retained jurisdiction. (5/03/06 Tr., p. 25, L. 10 - p. 40, L. 18.) 
For the first time on appeal, Halbesleben argues that the state's argument 
is fundamentally contrary to its recommendation, apparently believing that the 
facts of Halbesleben's crime inevitably lead to a greater sentence than the one 
recommended by the state, and it was therefore improper to talk at length about 
those facts. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-13.) This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Halbesleben did not object below, did not preserve this issue for appellate 
review, and has failed to show fundamental error. Second, even if reviewed, 
Halbesleben has failed to show that the state breached the plea agreement in 
anyway. 
B. Standard of Review 
It is well settled that plea agreements are contractual in nature. State v. 
Doe, 138 Idaho 409,410, 64 P.3d 335, 336 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman, 
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137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002). As such, the 
interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea agreement are 
matters of law reviewed de nova. Doe, 138 Idaho at 410, 64 P.3d at 336. 
C. Halbesleben Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457,459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at trial on other grounds 
did not preserve issue raised on appeal). Halbesleben did not object to the 
prosecutor's argument during sentencing, and did not move to withdraw her 
guilty plea, and thus did not preserve her claim of an improper sentencing 
argument for appellate review. 
An unpreserved issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the error 
claimed is fundamental. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 
(1995); State v. Lavy. 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 
Fundamental error has been defined as "such error as goes to the foundation or 
basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from 
the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court 
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 
854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts 
the proceedings that it "produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of 
his fundamental right to due process." State v. McCutcheon, 129 Idaho 168, 
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169, 922 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ct. App 1996) (citing 1§yy, 121 Idaho at 844, 828 
P.2d at873; Statev. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180,824 P.2d 109,111 (1991)). 
The majority of federal courts that have considered the issue have held 
that a claim of a breach of a plea agreement may not be addressed on appeal 
unless the appellant can show "plain error."2 United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 
546, 552 (9th Cir. 2008) (forfeited breach of plea claim reviewed for plain error); 
United States v. Puckett, 505 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. 
Peck, 496 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Rivera-
Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Where as here ... the defendant 
has knowledge of conduct ostensibly amounting to a breach of a plea agreement, 
yet does not bring that breach to the attention of the sentencing court, we review 
only for plain error.") (quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Salazar, 
453 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir. 2006) (breach of plea claim raised for first time on 
appeal reviewed for plain error); In re Sealed Case, 356 F.3d 313, 316-17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) ("[W]e join the majority of circuits that hold that a defendant who has 
the opportunity and knowledge to object to an alleged breach of plea agreement 
2 The plain error standard requires an appellant to show (1) there was error, (2) 
the error was "plain," (3) the error affected the substantial rights of the appellant, 
and (4) the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
[the] proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Idaho's fundamental error standard has been 
stated to be functionally equivalent to the federal plain error standard. See 
Crane Creek Country Club v. City of Boise, 121 Idaho 485, 487, 826 P.2d 446, 
448 (1990) ("[l]n the past we have held that where plain error or fundamental 
error has occurred, we will consider issues not raised on appeal.") (BAKES J., 
concurring specially); State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d 1283, 
1289 (Ct. App. 2003) ('The term, 'plain error,' in the context of a criminal case, 
embodies the concept of 'fundamental error.'") 
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by the prosecution cannot successfully assert it for the first time on appeal, 
unless his objection can survive plain error review."); United States v. Garcia-
Meza, 315 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2003) (breach of plea claim raised for first time 
on appeal reviewed for plain error); United States v. Thayer, 204 F.3d 1352, 
1356 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 65-66 
(4th Cir. 1997) ("Because McQueen raises [his breach of plea claim] for the first 
time on appeal, however, we must affirm the sentence imposed by the district 
court unless we find plain error."). But see United States v. Werner, 317 F.3d 
1168, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) ("A claim that the government has breached a plea 
agreement is a question of law we review de novo, even where, as here, the 
defendant failed to object at the time of the alleged breach."); United States v. 
Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633,636 (2nd Cir. 1999) (noting the court is not "bound to apply 
a plain error standard of review" to a claimed breach of plea not preserved for 
appeal). The reason for the majority rule is that 
an alleged breach of the plea agreement is precisely the type of 
claim that a district court is best situated to resolve. The claim is 
fact-specific, may require an evidentiary hearing or proffer of 
evidence, and the trial court, having taken the plea and having 
heard the evidence, should have the first opportunity to rule. A 
claim of breach of the plea agreement is not generally one which 
the passage of time may illuminate, but rather is the sort of claim 
which a defendant ordinarily will recognize immediately and should 
be required to raise when the alleged breach can still be repaired. 
United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1991 ). 
Idaho apparently follows the majority rule, as it requires a showing of 
fundamental error for appellate review of a breach of a plea agreement claim. 
See State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 141 P.3d 1136 (Ct. App. 2006) (applying 
8 
. ' 
j 
fundamental error standard and not reaching claim of breach of the plea 
agreement because interpretation of ambiguous provision of the plea agreement 
was factual question); State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 146 P.3d 681 (Ct. App. 
2005) review granted (2006) (applying fundamental error doctrine but concluding 
that claim of breach of plea agreement not reviewable where defendant 
intentionally avoided creation of additional record on question of whether there 
was breach). Thus, it is not enough for Halbesleben to generally claim 
fundamental error (Appellant's brief, p. 5); she bears the burden of showing that 
the error she claims in this case is fundamental. She has failed to do so . 
The only specific complaints Halbesleben makes about the prosecutor's 
argument is that it is "lengthy" and "overkill." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) She 
believes that the sentencing recommendation of the state was "relatively lenient" 
in comparison to the facts of the case, and therefore apparently believes that a 
long and complete recitation of those facts undermined the recommendation. 
(See generally Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.) Halbesleben has cited to no authority, 
and the state is unaware of any, for the proposition that a prosecutor can breach 
a plea agreement by talking about the facts of the case. 
Contrary to Halbesleben's argument, every time the Idaho appellate courts 
have found fundamental error in a prosecutor's sentencing argument the error 
deemed fundamental was a statement or action by the prosecutor that directly 
challenged the propriety of the state's own recommendation. In State v. 
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Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 616-18, 903 P.2d 1305, 1313-15 (1995),3 the state 
agreed to recommend an indeterminate life sentence for first degree murder (the 
most lenient sentence the court could impose) but then proceeded to present 
evidence in support of aggravation (necessary to support imposition of the death 
penalty) and specifically argued against giving Lankford "the most lenient 
treatment." In State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 774-76, 102 P.3d 380, 381-83 (Ct. 
App. 2004), the prosecutor stated that the state's recommendation should be 
considered a minimum recommendation. In State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 77 
P.3d 988 (Ct. App. 2003), the prosecutor stated that she had acquired 
information that Jones was not amenable to probation after the plea agreement 
was made, implying that she would not have agreed to the recommendation of a 
retained jurisdiction had she been aware of the new information at the time the 
agreement was entered. 
In all of these cases the prosecutor made specific statements that were 
contrary to the specific terms of the agreement. Those statements included an 
argument that the court not be lenient when the state's recommendation was the 
most lenient legally available to the court; an argument that the state's 
recommendation should be considered a "minimum" recommendation; and a 
statement that the prosecutor agreed to a recommendation holding out the 
possibility of probation without being aware of information indicating the 
defendant was not amenable for probation. None of these cases even hints that 
' The court in Lankford did not specifically address any question of whether the 
issue of breach of the plea agreement was preserved or was fundamental error. 
The case is none-the-less instructive. 
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it is possible to undermine a recommendation, and thus breach a plea 
agreement, merely by talking about the facts of the case, much less that it is 
fundamental error to do so. Halbesleben has failed to show fundamental error 
justifying appellate review by contending that the prosecutor dwelt too long on 
the facts of the crime in her sentencing argument. 
D. If Reviewed On Appeal. Halbesleben Has Failed To Show A Breach Of 
The Plea Agreement 
As noted, Halbesleben has not claimed that any particular statement by 
the prosecutor was contrary to the recommendation by the state as is required by 
the applicable law. Even if she had argued that specific statements by the 
prosecutor (as opposed to merely setting forth the facts of the case) were a 
breach of the plea agreement, she has failed to show error, much less 
fundamental error. 
In making a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently 
with the terms of the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995). The state is 
not, however, required to make its recommendation with enthusiasm. State v. 
Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 302, 77 P.3d 988, 991 (Ct. App. 2003) ('The prosecution's 
obligation to recommend a sentence promised in a plea agreement does not 
carry with it the obligation to make the recommendation enthusiastically."). The 
burden is on the defendant to show that the prosecutor's overall argument 
disavowed or was fundamentally at odds with the position she was obligated to 
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take pursuant to the plea agreement. Lankford, 127 Idaho at 617, 903 P.2d at 
1314 (sentence vacated because the state's comments at sentencing were 
"fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to recommend"); 
Jones, 139 Idaho at 303, 77 P.3d at 992 (sentence vacated because the 
prosecutor's comments "effectively disavowed" the recommendation). 
Consistent with this standard, the state's recommendation may include 
information that is unfavorable to the defendant if the information is relevant to 
the court's sentencing determination, and may remind the court of the applicable 
legal standards. State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 810, 10 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 
2000) (discussion of findings contained in the presentencing psychosexual 
evaluation does not constitute breach of a plea agreement); State v. Richards, 
127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Unless the State has 
specifically agreed to the contrary, the prosecutor may legitimately refer to 
information relevant to the sentencing determination and may permissibly refer to 
the objectives of sentencing."). 
Halbesleben has failed to show that the prosecutor's sentencing argument 
was at all improper. The prosecutor was arguing for an imposed sentence of 
twenty years with two years fixed. To make that argument she focused mainly 
on the facts of this crime and Halbesleben's ongoing history of child abuse and 
neglect.4 (Tr., p. 17, L. 14 - p. 25, L. 6.) The prosecutor only made four 
statements in argument that were not contentions of fact. 
4 Halbesleben points out that some of the facts were disputed, but acknowledges 
that this is not part of any claim of error. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
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First, the prosecutor argued that, considering Halbesleben's 13-year 
history "there has not been a worse case of child abuse in this county" in the last 
ten years and that none of the children born to the Halbeslebens "ever had a 
chance." (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 16-22.) Halbesleben has not claimed that this statement 
is fundamentally at odds with the state's recommendation. Even if she had, the 
record would not support such a claim. There is no evidence in the record that 
any other defendant convicted in Ada County of injury to a child in the last ten 
years was given a greater sentence, much less that some other defendant 
received a greater sentence than recommended even though she was in similar 
circumstances as Halbesleben (such as being a first-time felon or having other 
mitigating circumstances). In short, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
this statement is somehow a coded message asking the court to impose a 
sentence similar to a sentence in some other case that is greater than the one 
recommended by the state. This statement is in no way similar to the statements 
that have been deemed error by the Idaho appellate courts. Rather, it is 
consistent with the state's position that the facts of the neglect justify a prison 
sentence of twenty years with two years fixed even though Halbesleben is a first-
time felon and even though her husband may have played a more significant role 
in the harm inflicted on the children. 
The second statement that is not specifically factual is that the sexual 
abuse that the young girls suffered at the hands of their not-much-older brothers 
was "the worst part of this case." (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 9-13.) Although a statement of 
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opinion, it is an opinion that is not in any way inconsistent with the state's 
recommendation of a twenty years sentence with two years fixed. 
The third statement that is not a statement of fact is that the harm to the 
children was "incalculable" and "haunting." (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 7-13.) Again, although 
the statement is one of opinion, it is not an opinion that is directly and necessarily 
incompatible with the state's recommendation. 
Finally, the prosecutor argued that any sentence less than what the state 
was recommending "would depreciate the seriousness of what she did." (Tr., p. 
24, L. 25 - p. 25, L. 2.) This argument is also a proper argument. I.C. § 19-
2521 (1 )(c} (whether lesser sentence would depreciate seriousness of crime is 
factor court should consider in sentencing); Richards, 127 Idaho at 40, 896 P.2d 
at 366 (prosecutor may reference objectives of sentencing). 
The state's argument was focused on the egregiousness of Halbesleben's 
neglect and abuse - in other words, the facts of the case. Such an argument is 
entirely consistent with the sentencing recommendation of twenty years with two 
fixed for a first time offender. The sentencing court had many options less than 
the sentence recommended by the state, including withholding judgment, 
probation, or a sentence with less than 20 years total time, or 18 years 
indeterminate time, or two years determinate time. To argue against those 
options, and in favor of the recommendation it was making, the state was legally 
entitled to make sure that the court was aware of the relevant facts and to argue 
as the prosecutor did. Halbesleben's belief that the prosecutor's argument was 
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too long, or that it was somehow more compelling than strictly necessary to 
achieve the sentence it sought, is without legal or factual merit. 
11. 
Halbesleben Has Failed To Show Error In Sentencing Or Denial Of The Rule 35 
Motion 
A. Introduction 
Halbesleben contends that the district court erred when it denied 
Halbesleben's Rule 35 motion by (1) failing to understand the legal standards 
applicable to plea bargains when it concluded the recommendation was 
inappropriate for the crimes at issue (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23); (2) that the 
court was "disingenuous" in stating that the fact that the court followed the 
recommendation (of thirty years with fifteen years fixed) when sentencing 
Halbesleben's husband and co-defendant (who had sexually abused at least one 
of the children) was irrelevant to its exercise of sentencing discretion in 
Halbesleben's case (Appellant's brief, p. 24); and (3) the sentences are 
excessive because they are consecutive instead of concurrent (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 24-28). The first two arguments made by Halbesleben are unsupported by 
citation to any relevant authority and are therefore not properly before the Court. 
The third is without merit as Halbesleben has failed to demonstrate that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
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B. Halbesleben's Argument That The Court Must Give Weight To Sentencing 
Recommendations Is Unsupported By Any Relevant Law. And Is 
Therefore Not Before The Court For Appellate Consideration 
It is well established that in Idaho an appellate court will not consider an 
issue unless the party raising the issue supports it with relevant legal authority. 
I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); State 
v. Li, 131 Idaho 126,129,952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Halbesleben contends that the district court did not understand or apply 
the correct legal standard to her Rule 35 motion, contending that the district court 
was required to "consider" the recommendations of the parties. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 21-23.) The only legal authority cited by Halbesleben is language from 
one case that plea agreements are "an essential component of the administration 
of justice." (Appellant's brief, p. 22 (quoting Schoger v. State, _ Idaho_, 
_ P.3d _, 2008 WL 3905424, *6 (Idaho App., 2008)).) 
The issue in the cited portion of Schoger, the only case cited by 
Halbesleben on this issue, was whether counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue that a court had a duty to accept a proffered binding guilty plea or that the 
court in that case had abused its discretion in rejecting the proffered guilty plea. 
Schoger, 2008 WL at *6-9. The case says nothing about what weight, if any, a 
court must give to non-binding sentencing recommendations. Halbesleben has 
cited to no law that a sentencing court is required to give weight to a sentencing 
recommendation. Halbesleben's argument that the district court erred by 
concluding it did not have to give any weight to sentencing recommendations it 
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found inadequate under the facts of the case is unsupported by proper argument 
or authority, and is thus not presented. 
C. Halbesleben's Argument That The Court Was "Disingenuous" For Not 
Following The Recommendation In Her Case When It Followed The 
Recommendation In Her Husband's Case Is Not Preserved 
In denying Halbesleben's Rule 35 motion, the district court rejected 
Halbesleben's argument that her sentence should be reduced because "one 
defendant received the benefit of a plea negotiation and the other did not," 
stating that this argument was "not only irrelevant, it is disingenuous." (R., p. 
132.) Halbesleben contends the ruling by the district court was "disingenuous." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 24.) She does not meet her burden of providing legal 
authority or argument to support her argument, however, and therefore this issue 
is not properly before the appellate court for consideration. I.A.R. 35; State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); State v. Li, 131 Idaho 
126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998). 
In a footnote, Halbesleben cites to State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 186 
P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008), for the proposition that sentences imposed on other 
defendants are relevant in measuring the reasonableness of the sentence being 
challenged before the court. Without getting into a debate about whether the 
court of appeals was deviating from the long-recognized rule that Idaho courts 
will not engage in comparative sentencing, see, ~. State v. Pederson, 124 
Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993), the state merely notes that 
the Izaguirre court did not in any way address the argument presented to the 
district court in this case. 
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The district court in this case merely stated that the fact that it followed the 
recommendation as negotiated by plea agreement in Halbesleben's husband's 
case was irrelevant to the question of whether it abused its sentencing discretion 
in this case because it had not followed the recommendation as to Halbesleben. 
Halbesleben's argument that the court can compare sentences is a straw man for 
the district court's actual holding that it was not required to uniformly follow 
sentencing recommendations. Because Halbesleben does not even talk about, 
much less cite authority relevant to, the district court's actual holding that whether 
it followed the sentencing recommendations made in relation to Halbesleben's 
husband is irrelevant to whether Halbesleben's sentence is reasonable, she has 
failed to present this issue for appellate consideration. 
D. Halbesleben Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of The District Court's 
Sentencing Discretion 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant has the burden of 
establishing an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 
P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of 
discretion, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence was excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. 
To establish that the sentence was excessive, she must demonstrate that 
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to 
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining 
whether the appellant met her burden, the court considers the entire sentence 
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but, because the decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of 
the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of 
actual incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 
(2007). 
The facts of this case of child neglect and abuse are horrendous and long-
standing, and need not be set forth in detail here. (PSI, pp. 2-6, 14-16; see also, 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings, above.) Halbesleben 
has consistently minimized both her role in the neglect and the harm to the 
children. (PSI, pp. 6-7, 23.) The period of presumed incarceration, six years, is 
not excessive under these facts. 
Halbesleben's argument is primarily that because the court of appeals has 
in a handful of other cases found consecutive sentences to be excessive, her 
sentences should also be found excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-28.) 
Specifically, she contends that the sentences are excessive because she does 
not have a significant criminal history, did not behave "abhorrently" while 
incarcerated, and that the conduct underlying both convictions "was the same." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 28.) This argument fails given the severity of neglect; the 
harm caused the children; Halbesleben's own behavior that led to and failed to 
prevent the neglect and sexual abuse of her children; and the fact that the abuse 
went on for many years, among other reasons for the sentences. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentences imposed 
by the district court. 
DATED this 11th day of December 2008. 
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